Abstract-Voice Over IP (VoIP) or telephony services over Internet announces a new revolution in the telecommunication world for its management simplicity and cost reduction. VoIP security extends the existent risk range of IP protocols and infrastructures and introduces new attacks as well. Threats identification and standardization, secure signaling and media architectures, as well as intrusion detection and prevention mechanisms are currently under debate in the research community. We propose in this article a SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) specific honeypot. We describe its design and implementation. We detail the inference mechanism which classifies the received messages. We show how the model investigates about a received call and raises an appropriate conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even if VoIP attacks are not in the headline news in security reviews yet they soon will be of major harmfulness for the Internet telephony services. We witness more and more cases like eavesdropping which harms the customers privacy, or fraudulent usage which impacts enterprises budget.
Some of the attacks are inherited from the vulnerabilities of data networks over which the VoIP stack is operating. Others are possible because of the high performance and quality of service required by the application. Securing VoIP introduces new challenges in security management, and demands specific defense components such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and honeypots.
"A honeypot consists of an environment where vulnerabilities have been deliberately introduced in order to observe attacks and intrusions" [1] . This defense strategy is very successful even if sometimes it can be dangerous. We propose in this paper a phone playing such role. We aim in the first place to record the intruders activities, and understand their methodologies in order to enhance our protection systems.
In the next section, we go through an overview of the VolP threats. We debate about the research challenges of the VoIP security in section III. Functional aspects of our honeyphone to record and study attack traces is depicted in section IV. In section V we describe the honeyphone architecture. The honeyphone agent which is the core of this architecture is described in section VI. Section VII is an overview of the inference engine with an example of unrolling. We mention the related works in section VIII and we conclude the article in section X.
II. VoIP THREATS
The most important attacks that have started to be reported in the VoIP community are summarized below. Some attacks explore the target domain and promote other attacks. We refer the reader who is looking for a complete taxonomy to [2] .
A. Service disraption
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to affect the availability of the service application. According to the employed strategy, they are of different types:
* exploiting vulnerabilities in the VoIP stack of a server and take it down using malformed packets, . flooding the available bandwidth of a server by a distributed attack where several botnets are used in amplification. . flooding the server with a large amount of requests with different Call-Ids and without completing the three steps handshaking. The server capacities (memory and CPU) will be overloaded, * CANCEL and BYE SIP specific attacks might take place against the SIP call establishment procedure. 
E. SPAM over Internet telephony (SPIT)
The unsolicited SPAM messages that threaten users can be amplified by a more annoying voice advertising. SPIT scenarios include call centers (human employees) calling bots, ringtone SPIT (playing the advertising audios as the phone is ringing by use of the Alert-info header) and combinations of them [3] .
E Host based intrusions
Media Gateway Controllers (MGCs) and voice mail servers are critical points in the VoIP architectures. The MGCs are responsible for bridging between different networks such as between SIP based signaling (Internet) and ISUP based signaling (PSTN). The translation between a SIP message and an ISUP message consists of mapping the corresponding parameters. Malicious management of this process is another source of threat which is caused by the lack of authentication and integrity mechanism in the SS7 network. A more comprehensive threat model of the integrated signaling between VoIP and PSTN is found in [4] . Call Detail Records (CDRs) and users confidential informations must be protected against host intrusions and remote code execution as buffer overflow attacks.
G. Media protocols related attacks
The suite of multimedia transport protocols such as Real Time Protocol (RTP) and Real Time Control Protocol (RTCP) are vulnerable to attack. A demonstrative tool of the RTP play out attack was presented in [5] . Eavesdropping is about capturing and reconstructing the media stream from the RTP flow. While encryption prevents this, it can often be bypassed in those cases where the key is negotiated in clear.
Another Messaging are basically sociological events and it is hard to prevent them. Inside our VoIP honeypot architecture, we propose a verification scheme as a participation in the debate of the challenges mentionned above.
IV. FUNCTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE HONEYPHONE
In this section, we motivate the need for a VoIP honeypot by introducing functional scenarios where it can work and bring realistic benefits. The honeyphone works in an enterprise domain where multiple user agents are served by a VolP PBX or a SIP proxy. We built our own testbed with both Asterisk PBX 1 and SIP Express Router (SER) 2 In this section, we explain in more details the honey-pot agent components starting from the profile specifications and ending with the interaction with the reconnaissance tools.
A. Profile Configuration A profile is formed by two independent sets of parameters. The 'environment" parameters are used to set up the honeypot in its environment. They look like any soft-phone configuration parameters and use an attribute:value grammar. They determine two types of settings:
. host and honey-pot identity settings like for instance the IP address, protocol ports to be used, and the contact or list of contacts the honey-pot will register with.
* network dependencies like for instance the registrar server, the DNS server, SIP proxy and the VoiceMail server.
The "behavior" parameters allow to control the honeypot behavior. figure 4 we show a simplified state machine taken from [7] and how it can be written in our format. For example Idle{onhook/OpOnHook} means that in the Idle state the operator OpOnHook will take care of the event onhook.
To represent the operators that execute at the entry and the exit of a state, we add two keywords entry is an event generated when logging in the state, and exit is an event generated when logging out the state. Let us now take an example of a honeyphone profile. Assume that we need to set up the honeyphone to respond automatically after let us say 5 seconds of receiving a call, the Ringing clause has to be changed as follow: entry/OpStartRing(5), ringtimeout/OpAnwerCall After S seconds, the operator OpStartRing generates an instance of TimerEvent class. ringtimeout will be caught by the OpAnswerCall operator that drives the machine to the InCall state. To play back a speech file for 60 seconds after answering the call, a new line must be added in the Incall clause. In addition, we can record the conversation: entry/OpRecord, entry/OpPlayFile(speechO.mp3, 60) If 2 operators catch the same event, they execute in parallel threads.
The advantage of such an approach is that instead of events initiated by human interaction such as offhook and ophook, a honeyphone is able to automate these decisions. The preparatory stage is the process of transforming the behavior configuration file into a runnable state machine and it is fully automated. All the operators and events are pre-coded in appropriate classes and documented so that they can easily be used. A more friendly way to set up the different behavior requirements can be through the graphical interface. The GUI prompts the administrator to fill up a review form and then provides a suitable file to the preparatory stage.
B. Interaction with the reconnaissance tools
The investigation procedure about a received INVITE message is added in the honey-pot machine at the Idle clause as a INVITE/OpInvestigate statement. In a parallel direction of the call progress, the operator OpInvestigate will release the work of the verification tools through the interface of a specialized library.
The IP addresses and protocol ports that participate in the session initiation form the list under interrogation. The In addition, the inquiry procedure makes IP trace routes starting from the honeypot and arriving to the different hosts and proxies mentionned in the INVITE. The outputs of the inquiry procedure are brought towards the inference engine.
VII. THE INFERENCE ENGINE OF THE HONEYPHONE
The mere fact of receiving a message at the honey-pot is subject of suspicion. In the same time, it could be the result of unintentional error from an innocent user. Our approach is not restricted to messages received by the honeyphone but we aim at a larger scope to distinguish between normal messages and rogue messages. Rogue messages are those produced by crafting tools where some SIP headers are spoofed but are also those normally built up but forming part of VoIP specified attacks such as SPIT, user enumeration or DoS.
The interpretation of the results issued by the networkbased investigation functionalities could be assigned to a human operator who ranks an incoming message and notices if something goes wrong. Nevertheless we choose to release the operator from this task and provide our honeyphone with an artificial intelligence engine. The networks of plausible inference proved high efficiency to materialize the human reasoning by a probabilistic formalism. For example, if a message arrives at the honeyphone which is publicly unknown, there is a high prior probability for a suspicious hypothesis. We give a brief introduction about the Bayes inference rules and then we present our detection model.
A. Introduction to the Bayes inference
Bayesian methods provide a formalism for reasoning about partial belief under conditions of uncertainty [10] . They are based on the empirically verifiable relationship between posterior (the belief we accord a hypothesis H upon obtaining evidence e) and prior (P(H)) probabilities: P (HI ) P(clH)P(H) P(/ ) A Bayesian network is a directed acyclic graph whose arrows represent causal influences and each of its nodes represents certain knowledge. Bayesian trees are a subset of bayesian networks. In a Bayesian tree, each node might have several children and one parent. The propagation and fusion of the belief in a Bayesian tree are proceeded under the following rules: * The likelihood (or diagnostic) messages A are travelling upward the tree. * The prior (or causal) messages T are travelling downward the tree. . A child is linked to its parent by a conditional probability table (CPT) of which the elemuents are given by: CPTij = P(child j /parent =) Each row of the matrix is a discrete distribution over the child node states giving the parent node state and thus it sums to 1.
. The propagation of the prior messages is given by: child = a7parent * CPT(childlparent) (1) where w is a row vector and a is a constant to normalize the distribution. * The propagation of the likelihood messages is given by: Atparn = CPT(childdparent) * A6hild (2) child where A is a column vector. . The likelihood messages are fused together by an elementwise multiplication:
Aparent is obtained by normalizing the vector Lparent to the unit sum. * Finally, the belief over the states at a node is obtained by an elementwise multiplication of Aparent and Tparent and then normalizing the resulting vector by an appropriate constant 3:
) B. Bayes model to detect crafted and suspicious messages
We propose the model in figure 6 . We are interested in three hypothesis at the root node: * Crafted, where the incoming request is proved to be built up by an attack tool and some hosts and ports are verified to be not as claimed, * Suspicious: where the hosts and ports are positively verified, but the request is part of a traffic attack such as SPIT, and * Normal: where everything looks good and the request is just about a user fault. The Bayes model can learn new hypothesis and we may have different degrees of suspicion or craftiness. We are satisfied with these three hypothesis in our first prototype. The leaf nodes are observable evidences drawn directly or in function of the investigation responses. The variables at the leaf nodes are assumed to be conditionally independent. The new variables are defined as follow:
* To: The first thing that we do when we receive a message is to check up if it is really sent for us. Dynamic firewall design for IP telephony environments is evaluated and improved in [12] . Suitable intrusion detection and prevention architectures are proposed with prototype implementations as in [13] .The authors of [4] Our approach is new with respect to the previous works because it adds another layer of defense by using honeypots. Installing a honeypot allows to log and study attack traces and discover hackers methodologies ( [14] ). Our approach is also based on high reactivity properties of reconnaissance and investigation. We respond to the importance of inserting artificial intelligence in the analysis of data and the deduction of hypothesis. The theoretical background of our inference engine is inspired from [10] . Bayesian networks demonstrated real time feasibility and low fault rates when they were used in intrusion detection systems [15] .
IX. IMPLEMENTATION AND FUTURE WORKS
The honeyphone software is partially implemented around the open source code of [7] . We hope to have the complete architecture integrated in the software to be inserted and tested in the VoIP test bed of the EMANICS6 European project soon. Human users communicating across the project by a large set of IP phones will use different VoIP protocols and implementations which provide us with the necessary traces needed in the learning stage of the classifier. In addition, we are designing normal userbots according to normal user behavior in the PSTN telephony system to be launched in the test bed. In parallel, we are coding prototypes of VoIP attacks and SPIT bots to insert malicious attacks so the crrectness of the classifier can be tested and re-adjusted. While the real time performance of the honeyphone to gather and deal with relevant informations about the attacker was considered from the beginning, optimizing this performance to put suitable decisions in action within the time constraints is matter of an extended study in the future.
X. CONCLUSION We presented in this paper an innovative approach to design a VoIP specific honeypot. The honeyphone is supplied by an application program interface which controls a rich set of network tools. Rather than receiving and dumping SIP packets to be studying as attack traces, the honeyphone is able to gather information in real time about the received messages. An important component in our architecture is the inference engine which can differ between a routing fault, a shooted crafted message and a distrustable call. Simulation unrolling of examples showed promising results about the effectiveness of the information gathering tools and the correctness of the inference engine deductions.
